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HUMANNESS, PERSONHOOD, 
AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 
J. P. Moreland 
A widely adopted approach to end-of-life ethical questions fails to make 
explicit certain crucial metaphysical ideas entailed by it and when those ideas 
are clarified, then it can be shown to be inadequate. These metaphysical 
themes cluster around the notions of personal identity, personhood and hu-
manness, and the metaphysics of substance. In order to clarify and critique 
the approach just mentioned, I focus on the writings of Robert N. Wennberg 
as a paradigm case by, first, stating his views of personal identity, humanness, 
personhood, and the relations among them; second, offering a comparison of 
a view of humans as substances (understood in the classic interpretation of 
Aristotle and Aquinas) vs. a view of humans as property-things; third, apply-
ing the metaphysical distinctions surfaced in the second section towards a 
critique of Wennberg. 
During the last decade, there has been a growing body of literature about the 
ethics of abortion, infanticide, euthanasia, and suicide. In spite of the claims 
of philosophers like John Rawls and Kai Nielsen, who assert that ethics can 
and ought to be done without metaphysics, the central issues emerging in this 
body of literature involve, crucially and essentially, a treatment of metaphysi-
cal themes-the nature of being human, personhood, and personal identity. 
Ultimately, these themes will turn on what I take to be the most basic meta-
physical question(s) lurking in the neighborhood: Are persons in general, 
and human persons in particular substances or property-things and how are 
we to understand personal identity in light of this distinction? Unfortunately, 
among ethicists who treat end-of-life issues there is a widespread trend of 
avoiding serious metaphysical analysis in conjunction with these issues. 
Often, what follows are not conclusions purged of metaphysics', but rather, 
conclusions guided by an inadequate metaphysical perspective implicit (or 
supposedly implicit) in natural science. 
In what follows, then, I want to illustrate the importance of the metaphysi-
cal question(s) cited above for the ethics of life and death and to show, as 
clearly as possible, just how one's answer to it will affect one's overall 
position about the ethical matters involved. I also wish to clarify and criticize 
the widely accepted metaphysical viewpoint on these matters just mentioned. 
To do this, I will focus on an important discussion of end-of-life ethics by 
Robert N. Wennberg. 1 I choose Wennberg as a paradigm case because, in 
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my view, he exemplifies some of the unfortunate tendencies listed above. 
Moreover, his work is substantive and important in its own right and he is a 
Christian thinker who tries to relate personhood to the notion of the image 
of God. 
In what follows, I will, first, state my understanding of his views of hu-
manness, personhood, and personal identity. Next, the differences between 
a substance and a property-thing will be spelled out, followed by a critique 
of Wennberg's position. Of my two goals-making explicit the metaphysical 
issues involved in the line of thought to be examined and criticizing that line 
of thought-the former is more pressing than the latter due to the widespread 
neglect, mentioned earlier, of detailed metaphysical analysis as part of ethical 
reflection on end-of-life issues. If I can make certain neglected metaphysical 
issues clear in this context, especially issues in the metaphysics of substance, 
the relationship between personhood and humanness, and the importance of 
the soul for grounding biological functioning and giving unity to the body 
and making it human, then I trust that more metaphysical critique will be 
forthcoming. In light of this, there will be times that I will content myself 
with mentioning a line of argument without developing it in detail. Let us 
begin in earnest, then, and see what Wennberg tells us about personhood, 
personal identity, and being human. 
Wennberg on Personhood, Personal Identity, and Being Human 
Among other things, Wennberg is concerned with ethical issues involved in 
terminal choices regarding permanently unconscious patients. He summa-
rizes his own view in this way: 
I argued that what is of special value about human life is personal conscious-
ness, which makes it possible for the individual to participate in God's crea-
tive and redemptive purposes for human beings; biological human life is 
valuable because it sustains and makes possible personal consciousness, but 
where there is only biological or somatic human life, that special value no 
longer attaches to the individual, and biological or somatic death may be 
allowed to proceed unimpeded. 2 
We can break this thesis down into three important sub-theses: 
1. Personal identity. Though he does not explicitly say so, Wennberg's 
view of personal identity would seem to be an echo of the view of John 
Locke. 3 For one thing, Wennberg takes a substance to be a propertyless 
substratum and that was Locke's view.4 Further, Wennberg says that "When 
an individual becomes permanently unconscious, the person has passed out 
of existence, even if biological life continues. There cannot be a person 
where there is neither the capacity for having mental states nor even the 
potentiality for developing that capacity."s Elsewhere he says that "psychic 
life is what is essentially significant about human beings.,,6 It becomes clear 
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that personal identity is constituted by continuity of consciousness or the 
developed capacity of consciousness, e.g., of personality, agency, memory, 
purposeful action, social interaction, sentience, thought, will, and emotional 
states. This leads Wennberg to define the image of God as the actual or 
potential capability of "engaging in acts of intellect, emotion, and will" and 
of participating "in God's creative and redemptive purposes for human life.,,7 
To be in the image of God is to be a human ~erson and that image is conferred 
on those with the capacity for personhood. On this view, death is the total 
and irreversible loss of these capacities. When these are gone, personhood 
itself is gone and the person has ceased to exist. 
Finally, when it comes to the unity of a person at a time, Wennberg approv-
ingly cited Paul Churchland's claim that "it is the maturing of the nervous 
system that more than ancithing else renders the fetal organism a unity and 
not a collection of cells." As we will see later, Wennberg's statements lead 
to a rejection of absolute personal identity through change and unity at a time 
and persons turn out to be property-things. 
2. Humanness. Humanness itself is merely a biological notion. To be a 
human is simply to have "human or§anic life" or "biological human life" and 
be a "human biological organism.,,1 Wennberg explicitly claims that to be a 
human is merely to fall under a biological classification, viz. Homo sapiens. I I 
Thus, biology (and, perhaps, chemistry and physics) exhaust what it is to be 
human. 
Wennberg's views about being human, contrary to what he claims else-
where, represent a clear departure from the traditional Christian view which 
takes being human to go beyond mere biological description and to include 
theological and philosophical aspects as well. In any case, this is Wennberg's 
position and in this regard it bears a family resemblance to a frequently 
asserted train of thought that goes something like this: 12 The best, perhaps 
only way to justify the belief that all humans have equal and unique value 
simply as such is in light of the metaphysical grounding of the Judeo-Chris-
tian doctrine of the image of God. Such a view depicts humans as substances 
with a human nature and for at least two reasons, that framework must be 
abandoned. For one thing, the progress of science has regularly shifted 
entities (e.g., heat) from the category of substance to the category of quality, 
relation, or quantity. Thus, there most likely is no such thing as a human 
nature, and talk of such should be understood solely within the categories of 
biology, chemistry, and physics and with a view of humans as property-things. 
Second, Darwin's theory of evolution has made belief in human nature, though 
logically possible, nevertheless, quite implausible. As E. Mayr has said: 
The concepts of unchanging essences and of complete discontinuities be-
tween every eidos (type) and all others make genuine evolutionary thinking 
impossible. I agree with those who claim that the essentialist philosophies 
of Aristotle and Plato are incompatible with evolutionary thinking.13 
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This belief has, in turn, lead thinkers like David Hull to make the following 
observation: 
The implications of moving species from the metaphysical category that can 
appropriately be characterized in terms of 'natures' to a category for which 
such characterizations are inappropriate are extensive and fundamental. If 
species evolve in anything like the way that Darwin thought they did, then 
they cannot possibly have the sort of natures that traditional philosophers 
claimed they did. If species in general lack natures, then so does Homo 
sapiens as a biological species. If Homo sapiens lacks a nature, then no 
reference to biology can be made to support one's claims about 'human 
nature.' Perhaps all people are 'persons,' share the same 'personhood,' etc., 
but such claims must be explicated and defended with no reference to biol-
ogy. Because so many moral, ethical, and political theories depend on some 
notion or other of human nature, Darwin's theory brought into question all 
these theories. The implications are not entailments. One can always disso-
ciate 'Homo sapiens' from 'human being,' but the result is a much less 
plausible position.14 
Finally, this observation has lead a number of thinkers to claim that the 
traditional sanctity of life view of human beings is guilty of speciesism and 
to settle on personhood and not simply on being human, as constituting our 
locus of value. 
I am not claiming that Wennberg agrees with this entire line of thought, 
though his views do coincide at crucial points with much of it. My purpose 
here has been to locate his position about personhood in a broader intellectual 
context that will prove helpful when we turn to a critique of this notion of 
humanness. 
3. Personhood itself. For Wennberg, the paradigm case of a person is an 
adult human being, i.e., a creature with the developed capacities to think, 
will, feel, and have agency.15 Both the soul and personhood are properties 
(or sets of properties and the capacities for them) that supervene upon human 
biological life. It is possible to be a human non-person when psychic death 
occurs and there is irreversible loss of the capacities of consciousness cited 
above. In cases like this, there is a human present because human biological 
life continues, but the person has ceased to be. In general, being human is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for personhood. 16 
I have suggested that we understand Wennberg to mean that personhood 
supervenes upon a biological human life that is capable of sustaining psychic 
functioning. An example may help to clarify what is meant here. Wetness 
is an emergent or supervenient property that arises when water molecules are 
structured in a certain way. If we boil water, then although we still have 
water molecules themselves in the form of a gas, we can no longer have 
wetness because this property supervenes upon a specific structured arrange-
ment of water molecules sufficient for its emergence. 
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There are different understandings of supervenience. 17 However, a gener-
ally accepted understanding of it for properties runs as follows: Property P 
supervenes on property Q just in case 1) P and Q are completely distinct 
properties in that neither P nor Q enters into the very being or constitution 
of the other; 2) Pis ontologically dependent on and determined by Q; 3) the 
relation between P and Q is non-reductive; 4) For any possible world in which 
some entity x exists, if x has Q that is sufficient for its having P; there cannot 
be two entities alike in having Q but differing with respect to P. An entity 
cannot change in respect to P, cease to be P, or become more or less P without 
changing in respect to Q. 
For Wennberg, the supervenience relation obtains between personhood (the 
properties and capacities of consciousness) and being a certain functionally 
structured biological human. If a biological human is structured in a certain 
way so as to sustain personhood, then personhood supervenes. However, if 
the biological human becomes structured in a different, dysfunctional way, 
then even though it would still be a biological human, personhood would 
disappear. No change can occur at the personhood level (e.g., from the 
presence to the absence of personhood) unless there is a change. of a certain 
sort at the level of humanness (e.g., from a functional human to a dysfunc-
tional biological human). Personhood supervenes upon a properly structured, 
f . . b' 18 unctJOnmg ram. 
Thus, personhood is a supervenient property for Wennberg. 19 Moreover, 
he claims that there are such things as potential persons. He also says that 
personhood can be possessed to a greater and greater degree as someone 
develops until a point is reached where it is fully possessed.20 This means 
that personhood is also a degreed property with an intrinsic maximum. Some 
properties (e.g. oakness, being even) are non-degreed because they are either 
exemplified fully or not. Other properties are degreed because they can be 
qualified as being more or less. Some degreed properties do not have an 
upper limit or intrinsic maximum. The property of having weight or size 
would be an example. Other degreed properties do have intrinsic maxima, 
e.g., being cloudy. These properties can increase (or decrease) until a limit 
is reached beyond which no further increase is possible. 
Substances vs. Property-things 
At this point it will be helpful to step back for a moment and compare two 
different metaphysical positions about two very different kinds of wholes 
with parts: substances, understood in the classic interpretation of Aristotle 
and Aquinas, vs. property-things or ordered aggregates.21 
Living organisms are paradigm cases of substances according .to the tradi-
tional view. A substance is a thing which has or owns properties but is not 
had by something more basic than it. Second, a substance is a deep unity at 
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a point in time of parts, properties, and capacities, and it maintains absolute 
sameness through (accidental) change. Substances are wholes that are onto-
logically prior to their parts in that those parts are what they are in virtue of 
what the substance is, taken as a whole. A chamber of a heart is defined in 
terms of the heart as a whole, the heart is defined in terms of the circulation 
system as a whole and that system is defined in terms of the organism as a 
whole. Third, a substance is a this-such, i.e. an individuated member of its 
natural kind which, in turn, constitutes its essence. For example, two dogs 
are different particular animals with the same nature. The unity and nature 
of a substance derives from its essence that lies within it, and its parts (e.g., 
the nose and claws of a dog) stand in internal relations to each other in that 
if a part is removed from its whole, it looses its identity with itself. As 
Aristotle said, a severed human hand is, strictly speaking, no longer human, 
a fact that will become evident in a few days. 
An artifact like a table or automobile is a paradigm case of a property-thing. 
Property-things derive their unity from an external ordering principle (either 
in the mind of a designer or from a law of nature) that is imposed from the 
outside on a set of parts to form the object. A property-thing is structured 
stuff, i.e., parts placed in some type of ordering relation. In such wholes, the 
parts are prior to the whole, the whole contains some sort of structural prop-
erty that supervenes upon those parts (it is defined in terms of the parts and 
the ordering relation), the parts are related to each other by means of external 
relations, they remain identical to themselves regardless of whether or not 
they are in the whole property-thing (e.g., a car door is still what it is when 
detached from a car), and property-things do not maintain strict identity 
through loss of old parts or properties and gain of new ones. 
There are two other features of the traditional view of substance that are 
crucial to our topic. As was mentioned above, substances are a unity of 
capacities. Now, capacities come in hierarchies. There are first-order capaci-
ties, second-order capacities to have these first-order capacities, and so on, 
until ultimate capacities are reached. For example, if I can speak English but 
not Russian, then I have the first-order capacity for English as well as the 
second-order capacity to have this first-order capacity (which I have already 
developed). I also have the second-order capacity to have the capacity to 
speak Russian, but I lack the first-order capacity to do so. 
Higher order capacities are realized by the development of lower order 
capacities under them. An acorn has the ultimate capacity to draw nourish-
ment from the soil, but this can be actualized and unfolded only by developing 
the lower capacity to have a root system, then developing the still lower 
capacities a/the root system, and so on. When a substance has a defect (e.g., 
a child is color blind), it does not loose its ultimate capacities. Rather, is 
lacks some lower order capacity it needs for the ultimate capacity to be 
developed. 
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A substance's capacities culminate in a set of its ultimate capacities that 
are possessed by it solely in virtue of the substance belonging to its natural 
kind, e.g., Smith's ultimate capacities are his because he belongs to the 
natural kind "being human." A substance's inner nature is its ordered 
structural unity of ultimate capacities. A substance cannot change in its 
ultimate capacities; that is, it cannot loose its ultimate nature and continue 
to exist. Smith may replace his skin color from exposure to the sun and still 
exist, but if he looses his humanness, his inner nature of ultimate capacities 
that constitutes being human, then Smith ceases to exist. As we will see later, 
the fact that substances contain a hierarchy of capacities makes ambiguous 
the notion that a human being has lost such and such a capacity: 
Finally, sometimes properties relate to each other as a genus does to a 
species. Here are some genus/species relationships: being a color/being red; 
being a shape/being square; and, according to the traditional view, being a 
person/being a human. The species is a way by which the genus exists. 
Being red, square, or human are ways that being colored, shaped, or being a 
person exist in individual things. 
There can be colored things that are not red things, but there cannot be red 
things that are not colored things. Similarly, there can be persons that are 
not humans (Martians, angels), but there are no humans that are not persons. 
In fact, there is no such thing as a colored thing or person plain and simply. 
There are only kinds of colored things (e.g. red things) and kinds of persons 
(e.g., divine, human, angelic). Thus, in the classic doctrine of substance, 
there are no such things as human non-persons (e.g., defective newborns, 
permanent vegetative state or PVS patients). Given these points about the 
ultimate capacities and inner natures of substances and the notion that per-
sonhood is a genus?2 and without claiming to give a fully adequate definition 
of a person, we can, nevertheless, offer this general characterization: A 
person is a certain kind of living entity that has a certain fairly standard set 
of ultimate capacities (e.g., intellectual, volitional) that constitute its inner 
nature the way a genus constitutes the nature of a species. From what has 
been said, it seems clear that Wennberg's understanding of individual human 
beings, in a way reminiscent of Locke, is one that depicts them as property 
things qua persons irrespective of what we would say of them qua human. 
Before turning to a critique of Wennberg's position, it may be helpful to 
state and briefly sketch out a general response to two closely related objec-
tions to the view that living organisms like humans are substances. First, it 
could be argued that this view is just a form of biological vitalism and vitalism 
has been uniformly and justifiably rejected by modern biologists. Second, 
the substance view, with its notion of a single, underlying, unifying essence 
is inconsistent with certain empirical facts, e.g., various cases of fission such 
as identical twins or organisms that can have a piece broken off to form a 
whole new organism. 
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The short answer to these problems is this: the classic doctrine of substance 
is an intellectual response to a set of distinctively metaphysical issues that 
are relatively independent of (and arguably conceptually prior to) and not in 
competition with most of the more empirical, scientific issues associated with 
living organisms. This point can be expanded to address the two objections 
just cited. 
Consider first the problem of vitalism. The debate about vitalism has been 
misunderstood frequently since the concepts of that debate have been used 
in many different ways. For example, during its zenith as a scientific research 
program, there were at least five distinct forms of vitalism.23 The more crude 
forms of vitalism have rightly been rejected because of their tendency to 
depict the individuated essence as either a spatially located vital entity, a 
force, or a fluid (like caloric or phlogiston) that was viewed as a mechanistic 
entity alongside other mechanical parts. The effect of this strategy was ac-
tually to reduce the living organism to a special sort of property-thing and it 
was used as a quick and easy solution that closed enquiry. 
A more adequate vitalism, if we wish to use this term of the substance view, 
grounds the doctrine of substance in factors like the irreducible organic, 
holistic relation among parts to parts and parts to whole (and vice versa), the 
species specific immanent law of organization and development, and the 
internal structural form and functioning found in living things. Such a posi-
tion does not eschew the methodological use of a machine metaphor as a 
means of answering how questions about organisms as long as this is not 
taken to reduce those organisms to mere heaps or property-things. 
Regarding fission cases, the notions of substance and essence are grounds 
of and not replacements for the a posteriori, scientific search for more de-
tailed species specific principles of individuation. There is no a priori way 
to read off from the abstract notion of a thing's essence the precise nature of 
the immanent laws that constitute it. If we assume a Traducian view of 
generation or focus on cases like mitosis, identical twins, or starfish-type 
fissions, we simply discover as a brute fact that certain substances, once they 
have developed a structure adequate to provide a framework for part replace-
ment or for generating new substances, have the capacities in question. Noth-
ing whatsoever in the notion of substance provides a bar to these realities. 
It may be claimed that my response here is ad hoc, but such an assertion 
would be wide of the mark for the following reason. My treatment of fission 
cases is not an adjustment of the substance view but a natural outgrowth of 
it. The substance position allows for all sorts of empirical possibilities and 
merely grounds the empirical investigations rather than trying to answer them 
in advance. However, as I will argue later, what does seem ad hoc is the 
claim by advocates of the property-thing view that personhood supervenes 
upon a properly structured, functioning human brain. This is ad hoc because 
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neither the nature of personhood itself, nor the fact of supervenience follows 
naturally from nor is verifiable by any detailed advance in knowledge of the 
physical aspects of the brain (or body) considered solely at that level of 
description. More could be said about these matters, but I want to set them 
aside and turn to a critique of Wennberg's position. 
A Critique of Wennberg's View 
1. Problems with personal identity. Wennberg's view of persons implies that 
they do not maintain absolute identity through change or absolute unity at a 
time. This is due to his apparent advocacy of some version of the memory 
view of personal identity (where this is taken to cover any view of personal 
identity constituted by continuity of consciousness or a low order capacity 
for it) and his view of persons as property-things. Because of space limita-
tions and the massi veness of this topic, I can only gesture at a few points 
here. But I hope to make clear what is at stake in Wennberg's view. 
First, based on common sense intuitions, counter examples exist to the 
effect that continuity of consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
personal identity. Surely, it is logically possible that two persons could have 
all and only the same memories, character traits, etc., and that a person could 
still sustain personal identity even if a total loss of memory, etc. were to 
obtain. Further, fear of the future and punishment for past deeds would seem 
to presuppose absolute personal identity. A denial of absolute personal iden-
tity appears to require a radical revision of our basic intuitions about future 
fear and punishment, e.g., what we fear is the failure of our present projects 
to be fulfilled, we punish merely to deter, rehabilitate, or protect society. I 
know my terse remarks here do not settle this issue, but one ought to think 
long and hard before abandoning the insights about personal identity gained 
from reflection on these problems. Of course, these intuitions can be called 
question-begging or simply denied. But I don't think they can be dismissed 
that easily. We are owed some account of why they have such prima facie 
plausibility and, apart from the claim that our concept of personhood is 
conventional and arbitrary-which I deny and I suspect Wennberg does too-
l know of no such account that does justice to the power of these intuitions 
apart from the view that personal identity is absolute. 
This leads to a second point. Our knowledge that we are first person 
substantial, unified, enduring selves that have bodies and mental states but 
are not identical to them is grounded in our own awareness of ourselves. It 
is hard to see what kind of knowledge could be more certain than this and 
what better example of unity there could be than my awareness that I am only 
one self at a time, an enduring self through time, and that I am the owner of 
my mental states. Experiences like listening to a song present themselves, 
phenomenologically speaking, as experiences had by an enduring substantial 
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self and not as a stream of person stages constituted my consciousness or 
actual first order capacities that can come and go. I experience myself as 
the same I that simultaneously has different mental states and I experience 
myself to be the substantial owner of those states and not as a collection of 
them or as something predicated of a more basic entity. These features of 
first person awareness are hard to square with Wennberg's claims that the 
brain is the center of mental functioning (as opposed to being causally related 
to my substantial self which is the true center of mental functioning) and that 
I have the type of unity possessed by a property-thing due to the fact that my 
unity "emerges" upon a mature nervous system. 
Third, as I have argued elsewhere, human action (e.g., thinking through a 
syllogism and drawing a conclusion, carryin~ out an intention) seems to 
require a unified, enduring self to be possible. 4 I cannot develop the argu-
ment here. But if this is correct, then moral acts require an enduring self, 
which, it could be argued, would seem to require as a necessary condition, 
d . IS an en unng essence. 
Furthermore, William Rowe and others have claimed, correctly in my view, 
that libertarian freedom and agency have a substance view of the self as a 
necessary condition.26 If libertarian freedom is a necessary condition for 
moral responsibility, then a substantial self is necessary for morally respon-
sible action. Wennberg's view of the self as a property thing, then, is hard 
to square with moral responsibility if, in fact, libertarian freedom is a neces-
sary condition. 
In addition, it is worth mentioning in this context that advocates of the 
supervenience view of personhood have difficulty avoiding an epipheno-
menal view of the mental. The two main desiderata of the supervenience 
treatment of the mental are to advocate non-reductive physicalism and the 
dependency of the mental on the physical. This latter goal is an expression 
of the idea that the physical is basic and causally closed. Taken together, 
these two goals are hard to sustain simultaneously so as to avoid turning the 
mental into epiphenomena. If the mental are reduced to the physical, then 
the mental can be causally efficacious, but this violates desideratum one. On 
the other hand, if this reduction is denied in the interests of supervenience, 
then there is no room for "top-down" causation due to the second desideratum 
and the closed causality of the physical. 
I am not claiming to have demonstrated here that absolute personal identity 
through change and libertarian freedom are necessary conditions for morally 
responsible action, nor have I demonstrated that these necessary conditions 
require a substance view of the self and are incompatible with the self as a 
property-thing or the supervenience view of personhood. I am merely point-
ing to a widely recognized connection among these notions. 
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In addition, if this connection is correct, as I believe it to be, then it serves 
as an undercutting defeater for Wennberg's position in this way.27 Wennberg 
begins by focusing on what are and are not our morally responsible actions 
regarding certain end-of-life issues. His reflections lead him to a view of 
personal identity (a person is a property-thing and persons are series of events 
with temporal parts) that are inconsistent (so I claim) with the necessary 
conditions of morally responsible actions themselves (a substantial self to 
ground absolute personal identity through change and libertarian freedom and 
agency). This generates a skeptical situation in which his own views of 
personal identity serve as undercutting defeaters of the very thing (morally 
responsible action) his views were formulated to explain. 
Again, Wennberg can escape this problem by claiming that the necessary 
conditions cited are not, in fact, necessary at all. I cannot enter into that 
dialogue here, but I hope that I have placed Wennberg's views in a broad, 
metaphysical context and clarified what his position seems to imply. 
Finally, it would seem that personal identity in a disembodied state would 
be problematic for Wennberg's view. For one thing, what if two disembodied 
persons had the very same psychological traits? Which one would be I? 
Second, his view of personal identity would seem to imply that persons 
essentially have temporal parts. But this means, among other things, that I) 
someone could not have been born at a time other than that person's actual 
birth, and 2) a person could not cease to be at one moment and come to be 
at a later time. 
Both of these possibilities are ruled out by Wennberg's views of personal 
identity because they entail what Wennberg's position denies, namely, that 
temporal parts are not necessary constituents of persons. But I see no diffi-
culty in conceiving a possible world in which I was born at a different time 
than that of my actual birth. And biblical teaching would seem to affirm that 
I myself will exist in an afterlife. 
Wennberg agrees with this teaching, but I can see only two ways he might 
try to allow for it.28 It may be that the person goes out of existence when 
he or she becomes a PVS patient and God recreates that person ex nihilo in 
the afterlife. But, as I just pointed out, this option is not available for 
Wennberg. On the other hand, God may simply preserve a specific set of 
personhood properties or series of person stages into the afterlife. Consider 
personhood properties first. This suffers from the fact that a specific set of 
properties can be exemplified by more than one object. Pure properties do 
not individuate and cannot be sufficient for personal identity. A person is 
a substance with properties, not a set of properties. The person stage 
option suffers from the standard difficulties with denials of absolute per-
sonal identity. In this context, it means that a Doppelganger survives in 
the afterlife and not I myself. 
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Finally, as we have just seen, Wennberg's views imply that for PVS patients 
(where no person is present), a person existed before the PVS state, went out 
of existence during the PVS state, and is recreated ex nihilo in heaven. But 
apart from problems of personal identity cited above, it just seems more 
natural to say that during the PVS state, the person is still present though in 
a severely defective state and that in the afterlife, God does not recreate the 
person or continue a series of events, but merely restores some lost lower 
order capacities to the very same person who existed before the PVS state. 
2. Personhood and the personhood/humanness relation. It is well known 
that detailed, widely shared criteria for personhood are hard to come by. We 
have a general notion of some traits of persons, but our ability to recognize 
persons is not dependent upon noting that some entity satisfies a cluster of 
supervenient properties or capacities. I suggest it is much more natural to 
view the personhood/humanness relation in light of a metaphysical ~attern 
widely exemplified in reality, namely, as a genus/species relation. 2 This 
would explain how there could be non-human persons just as there can be 
non-red colored things, without having to hold the controversial thesis that 
there could be humans that are not persons. Metaphysically speaking, the 
relation between personhood and humanness is more intimate than is allowed 
if the relation is taken to be a supervenience one. Personhood and humanness 
are different entities, but personhood enters into the very being of humanness 
-humanness is a way personhood can exist-and humanness is metaphysi-
cally dependent upon personhood as a species is dependent upon its genus, 
not the other way around. 
Moreover, the supervenience view implies that the coming-to-be and ceas-
ing-to-be of a person is not the same event as the birth and death of the human. 
That is, my coming to be took place after the formation of the human which 
was to become me and my ceasing to be antedated the death of the human 
that was me. As H. Tristram Engelhardt notes, this view implies that "one 
is, or should be, concerned with determining when in human ontogeny hu-
mans become persons.,,30 But apart from the arbitrariness and opacity of 
such judgements and the bizarre implications that follow from it (I myself 
was not conceived at intercourse or carried in my mother's body but, rather, 
I came into existence sometime before a functioning human body became 
two years old), this flies in the face of clear Biblical passages that identify 
the person himself, and not a non-identical precursor, with the entity in the 
womb (cf. Psalm 139:13-15, Jeremiah 1:5, Luke 1:41). 
Further, if we take the relation between personhood and humanness to be 
one of supervenience, then personhood becomes onto logically dependent 
upon humanness. This means that it is metaphysically impossible for disem-
bodied existence to obtain if humanness is understood in Wennberg's sense 
as biological human life. But Scripture seems to teach a disembodied inter-
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mediate state in which human persons exist even though they have no organic, 
biological life. Even if someone does not think this is the correct way to 
understand Scripture (and this would be hard to sustain exegetically), surely 
such a view is at least possible. But if Wennberg is right, disembodied 
existence (at least for human persons) must be judged metaphysically impos-
sible, and this is a strong position indeed. Moreover, the genus/species view 
explains how non-human persons like God or angels could obtain (as 
Wennberg himself admits), but the supervenience view makes this possibility 
unintelligible due to its rendering of personhood ontologically dependent on 
a properly functioning human brain. 
Of course, it could be argued that it is only human personhood that requires 
a properly functioning brain for its supervenience, and not divine or angelic 
personhood. But, apart from the fact that this seems a bit ad hoc, it also 
threatens to divide the unity of the class of persons. That unity is grounded 
in a univocal sense of personhood true of each member of the class. But if 
one embraces different notions of personhood itself, it will be hard to have 
a unified class of persons. Why? Because this would entail the idea that 
there is a human personhood (which requires a functioning brain) and a 
non-human personhood (which has no such requirement) without utilizing 
the standard genus/species model to explicate this. It preserves the unity of 
the class of persons to treat personhood as a genus with humanness as one 
of its specific differentia. And such a view explains the differences between 
humans and other types of persons by means of the species, not the genus. 
If there is more than one genus of personhood, then the unity of the class of 
persons is lost and an equivocal notion of "personhood" is used of humans 
and other "persons." 
There is another difficulty with taking personhood to be a property that 
supervenes on a properly functioning brain. In every case I can think of in 
science, when one thing is said to supervene upon another, we can tell that 
the supervenient property is there by inspecting the subvenient entity. This, 
in turn, implies that we are able to be aware of the two entities that stand in 
the supervenience relation, even if we do not have exhaustive knowledge of 
either. For example, we are able to inspect water itself to see if it has wetness 
and we are aware of the distinction between water and the wetness that 
. 31 
supervenes upon It. 
But such is not the case for personhood and the human brain. In fact, I 
myself do not believe that thoughts, sensations, agency, etc. are "in" the brain 
in any interesting sense of the word. To be sure, there is a causal connection 
between mental and brain phenomena, but the same could be said for mental 
and other bodily phenomena. 
But regardless of this point, no amount of inspection of the brain can 
establish the emergence of personhood upon it. And if we take the pheno-
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menological data of first person introspection seriously, then we are not aware 
of any aspect of the brain 1) existing or 2) being the subject of predication 
(or supervenience) for states of personhood or 3) being the center of mental 
functioning and unifier of the person as Wennberg claims. Thus, personhood 
fails to fit the pattern true of other examples of supervenience in science and 
for that reason I suggest we abandon the supervenience model of personhood. 
3. The nature of a capacity. Another problem is that Wennberg fails to 
have a sufficient understanding of the nature of a capacity and, thus, he does 
not take into account the ambiguity in what it means to say a person has, 
does not have, or has lost such and such a capacity. I now have the capacity 
to speak English but not Russian. I use to have the capacity to do differential 
equations but, alas, I no longer possess that capacity. The kind of capacities 
in view here are first order capacities. I do not have the first order capacity 
to speak Russian or do differential equations, but I do have the second order 
capacity to develop these capacities. Thus, the absence of a lower order 
capacity says nothing about the absence or presence of a higher order capac-
ity. In fact, as already pointed out, a higher order capacity unfolds and 
develops by a process of realization in which lower order capacities under it 
are cultivated in lawlike ways grounded in a thing's inner nature. 
Moreover, a defect merely signals the loss of a lower order capacity, not 
the absence of a thing's ultimate capacities that make up its nature. A defect 
is the absence of a lower order capacity that blocks the development of a 
higher order one. When a metal bar is heated, it looses the first order capacity 
to reflect certain kinds of light, but not the higher capacity to have that first 
order capacity as becomes obvious when the metal cools. Note, even if a 
lower order capacity is irreversibly lost, that by itself does not mean the 
higher order ones are gone. Ultimate capacities are developed through the 
cultivation of lower order capacities that realize the ultimate ones, and defects 
do not signal the non-existence of ultimate capacities, but merely the failure 
of those capacities to be realizable in the appropriate ways. 
Consider again a PVS patient. The absence of certain capacities should be 
understood as the absence of first order capacities, not ultimate capacities, 
even if such loss is irreversible in the bodily state. Why? Because this way 
of understanding fits the pattern of substances in general and it implies that 
in the afterlife God merely restores lower capacities to enduring persons, 
rather that recreating the person ex nihilo. 
This distinction between higher and lower order capacities serves another 
purpose as well. There are two things about first order capacities that are 
troublesome from a moral point of view. First, we do not have them when 
we sleep. During sleep, I do not exemplify or have certain first order capaci-
ties of consciousness. I must first awaken (I still have the capacity to be 
awake while sleeping), and then I can, say, exercise the capacity to make 
certain volitional choices. 
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Second, our various capacities to participate in God's creative and redemp-
tive purposes, which Wennberg claims constitute our personhood, are degreed 
properties that can be quantified in greater or smaller degrees and that do not 
appear to have (at least finite) intrinsic maxima. We do not all have the same 
capacity for thought, volition, etc. Now we do not want to say that a person 
ceases to exist and has no moral status while sleeping, nor do we want to say 
that equal rights for all persons is impossible because we do not all have 
personhood (understood as the possession of degreed properties or capacities 
without intrinsic maxima) to the same degree. 
The best way to avoid these implications is to appeal to the continued 
possession of higher order capacities in the absence of lower order ones. But 
once this is done, two things seem to follow. For one thing, it is recognized 
that the absence of a first order capacity, permanent or otherwise, does not 
signal the loss of higher order ones. In addition, such an appeal implicitly 
utilizes the notion of the continued possession of human personhood as the 
inner nature of the individual in question. Thus, PVS patients may not have 
first order capacities, but they still have higher order ones in virtue of the 
continued presence of their inner nature and this is what makes them human 
persons. 
Wennberg fails to take this possibility into account and this failure is curi-
ous in light of something he says elsewhere.32 He claims that personhood 
grows as a child develops until it is fully a person. But he goes on to say 
that the person continues to develop beyond this point. Now just what is it 
that continues to develop? If it is the properties that constitute personhood, 
how can we say that the child is fully a person? The problem·here is that 
personhood turns out to be a degreed property without an intrinsic maximum 
and, thus, it cannot be exemplified to a complete degree. On the other hand, 
Wennberg may be thinking that when the properties of personhood are fully 
present then other properties emerge and begin to develop. But this move 
implicitly utilizes the notion of higher and lower order capacities such that 
some cannot obtain until others have been developed. If Wennberg uses that 
move in one case, why can we not use it in the case of PVS patients? 
4. Being human is not merely biological. Finally, I think that Wennberg's 
view of being human is too Cartesian to do justice to a Christian theology of 
the body and an appropriate metaphysical treatment of it. Put briefly, his 
view of the human person is Cartesian in the sense that personhood and 
personal identity are too closely tied to the mental. As is well known, the 
Cartesian view cannot adequately allow for or explain the humanness of the 
body with its species specific set of properties and the substantial unity it 
possesses. 
In my view, a more adequate position is the classic view of Aristotle and 
Aquinas in which the soul is the ground, not only of mental functioning, but 
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also of biological processes. While I cannot develop the argument here, I 
take the classic view to be superior to the Cartesian position in two ways. 
First, it is more consistent with Biblical teaching that the body is irreducibly 
human (cf. I Co 15: 35-49). Second, it more adequately accounts for the 
specific type of unity that the human body has due to its depiction of the 
human being as a substance and not as a property thing. If the soul is, indeed, 
the ground of biological functioning, and if the human person is identical to 
his substantial soul, then if the human body is still functioning biologically 
as a unit, then the human person is still present irrespective of the presence 
or absence of first order mental capacities. 
Wennberg and those of his persuasion may not agree with this view, but 
the virtual absence of taking into consideration the Aristotelean/Thomistic 
position is, in my view, inexcusable because that position is both defensible 
and clearly relevant to the issues at hand. For example, the Cartesian per-
spective will tend to support some sort of brain criterion of death while the 
Aristotelean/Thomist view will see the brain as just another bodily organ and 
favor a criterion focusing on the permanent cessation of functioning of the 
organism taken as a whole. 
In conclusion, my critique of Wennberg has been a brief attempt to show 
that no sufficient reason has been given by him for his views about person-
hood, humanness, and personal identity. If I am right about this and about 
the issues related to it, more is going on here than PVS patients and the ethics 
of terminal choices.33 Of fundamental significance is the importance for 
ethics of metaphysics in general, of being clear about the connection between 
ethical views and certain metaphysical positions, and of seeing the inade-
quacy of utilizing a metaphysical picture embedded in scientific explications 
of these three themes?4 
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